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Background: The third wave of H7N9 cases in China emerged in the second half of 2014. This study was
conducted to identify the risk trends of H7N9 virus in human infections and environment contamination.
Methods: A surveillance program for H7N9 virus has been conducted in all 90 counties in Zhejiang since March 2013.
All H7N9 cases were reported by hospitals through the China Information System for Disease Control and Prevention.
Sampling sites for environment specimens were randomly selected by a multi-stage sampling strategy. Poultry-related
workers for serological surveillance were randomly selected from the sampling sites for environmental specimens in
the first quarter of each year. rRT-PCR and viral isolation were performed to identify H7N9 virus. A hemagglutination
inhibition assay was conducted to detect possible H7N9 infection among poultry-related workers.
Results: A total of 170 H7N9 cases were identified in Zhejiang from 20 March 2013 to 28 February 2015. The
proportion of rural cases increased from 42.2 % (19/45) to 67.7 % (21/31) with progression of the three epidemics
(P < 0.05). In 32 % (161/503) of towns and 16.0 % (238/1488) of surveyed premises, H7N9 virus was detected in the
environment. The positive rate of environmental specimens was 6.1 % (868/14207). In addition, 912 poultry-related
workers were recruited and 3.7 % (34) of them tested positive for H7N9 antibodies. Positive detection of H7N9 virus
during environmental surveillance increased from the first to third wave (P < 0.05). Almost all positive rates of
environmental surveillance were higher in urban than rural in the second wave (P < 0.05), however they were higher in
rural area in the third wave (P < 0.05).
Conclusions: Our study highlights that the severity of poultry-related environmental contamination by H7N9 virus is
intensifying. We strongly recommend that the local government stop illegal trading immediately and close live poultry
markets in the territory. Poultry operations in slaughtering plants must be supervised rigorously. Prior to the closure of
live poultry markets, daily cleaning and disinfecting of areas potentially contaminated by H7N9 virus, centralized
collection and disposal of trash, designating certain days as market rest days, banning overnight poultry storage and
other measures should be strictly carried out in both urban and rural areas.
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Since a novel reassortant avian influenza A (H7N9) virus
emerged in China in February 2013 [1], China experi-
enced two waves of H7N9 human infection that resulted
in over 400 human cases [2, 3]. The third wave emerged
on 1 November 2014, and nearly 200 H7N9 human in-
fections have been identified as of 28 February 2015.
Earlier studies suggested that the H7N9 virus is a
multiple reassortant virus, with gene fragments de-
rived from H7N9, H9N2 and H7N3 subtypes of influ-
enza A virus [4, 5]. Poultry farms and live poultry
markets (LPMs) are possible sources of reassortant
virus and human infection [6–8].
Zhejiang is a province in southeastern China with the
second highest number of H7N9 cases. It consists of 11
prefectures and 90 counties and has a population of
more than 50 million. It is one of the most developed
provinces in China, with large-scale poultry and swine
breeding industries. Since the first H7N9 case emerged
in March 2013 in Zhejiang Province, virologic surveil-
lance for H7N9 virus has been conducted in LPMs,
poultry farms, slaughtering and processing plants, and
habitats for migratory birds within the province.
The past two epidemics led to 139 H7N9 cases (49
deaths) in Zhejiang Province, of which 72 (52 %) subjects
were urban residents. The government closed the LPMs
in the central towns, and the epidemic was controlled ef-
fectively (77 cases occurred before and 17 cases after mar-
ket closures during the second wave). Compared to over
half of cases distributed in urban areas in the past two
waves, all 14 of the first cases in the third wave were in-
fected in rural LPMs. This suggests new characteristics of
H7N9 virus. The aim of this study was to identify the epi-
demiological characteristics and risk trend of H7N9 virus
in human infection, environmental contamination and in-
cidence of infection of poultry-related workers.
Methods
Definition of the three waves
Based on the date of onset, the first wave in Zhejiang
Province was defined from 20 March to 30 September
2013. In this wave, the first and last cases occurred on
20 March and 16 April 2013, respectively. No additional
cases were identified until October 2013. We defined the
second wave as starting from 1 October 2013 and ceas-
ing on 31 October 2014. In the second wave, few cases
were reported after March 2014 except for one person
who developed symptoms on June 3, 2014. The third
wave started on 1 November 2014 and continues as of
the date of writing.
Confirmation of patients
A confirmed case is defined as clinical symptoms con-
sistent with acute influenza (fever, cough, coryza,difficulty breathing) or with a history of contact with a
confirmed or suspected case and a laboratory test posi-
tive for avian influenza A (H7N9) virus, with subtype
confirmed by PCR, viral isolation or a four-fold or
greater increase in serum antibodies specific for this
virus isolated from paired sera. A severe case is a con-
firmed case with pneumonia complicated by respiratory
failure or other organ failure [9].
The surveillance protocol for H7N9 cases stipulates
that all hospitals in Zhejiang Province must report all
cases through the China Information System for Disease
Control and Prevention [10]. Respiratory specimens are
to be collected from patients with influenza and tested
for H7N9 viral nucleic acid by hospitals or local influ-
enza network laboratories. Positive specimens are to be
forwarded to the provincial influenza network laboratory
for viral isolation. Serum samples collected by hospitals
are to be sent through the local influenza network la-
boratory to the provincial influenza network laboratory
for antibody testing.
Surveillance sites and sample collection
A surveillance program on H7N9 virus was conducted
from March 2013 to February 2015 in all 90 counties of
the 11 prefectures in Zhejiang Province. A multi-stage
sampling strategy was used to select sampling sites for
collection of environmental specimens. In each prefec-
ture, one-third of counties were surveyed per quarter
and all counties would have been covered in 2013. In
2014, the frequency was changed to monthly with all
counties covered quarterly. Then, two or more premises
were randomly selected in each county and at least two
sampling sites were randomly selected at each of the
premises. About 10 environmental specimens (1–2 for
each type of sample) were collected from each sampling
site. Overall, each prefecture was asked to collect 15–30
specimens each time for every type of environmental
sample, which added up to at least 30 specimens during
the influenza epidemic period (October to March of the
following year).
The environmental sampling premises included LPMs,
poultry rearing farms, concentrated areas of backyard
poultry farms, slaughtering and processing plants, habi-
tats for migratory birds, and other poultry-related prem-
ises (such as living quarters of H7N9 cases, restaurants,
supermarkets, and markets selling cold fresh poultry).
The sampling premises were randomly selected in the
area and had to meet one of the following criteria: (1)
had reported human or poultry infection with H7N9
virus; (2) had a relatively high density of lakes, rivers or
other bodies of water; (3) had a developed poultry breed-
ing industry; (4) was near habitat for migratory birds or
was located on a migration route; (5) had a high propor-
tion of domestic poultry backyard farmers.
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poultry housing in the poultry rearing farms, a raising-
household in the concentrated areas of backyard poultry
farms and a random site at different direction in the
habitats for migratory birds.
Each type of environmental sample was collected prior
to disinfection, including fecal dropping swabs, poultry
cage swabs, drinking water samples, sewage from clean-
ing poultry, and swabs of tables used for slaughtering or
sprocessing poultry. Fecal specimens of 3–5 g were col-
lected from fresh fecal droppings and put into sampling
tubes. Poultry cage specimens were collected through
swabbing 3–5 positions on the cage surface where fre-
quently touched by poultry. Drinking water specimens
of 5–10 ml were collected from water troughs that were
shared by all the poultry in the same cage. Sewage (5–
10 ml) was gathered from basins or buckets used for
cleaning poultry. The method of collecting specimens
from tables for slaughtering or processing poultry was
the same as for collecting poultry cage specimens. All
environmental specimens were disrupted repeatedly in
sterile conditions to break up the solid matter, and then
were precipitated for 30 min at 4 °C or centrifuged for
10 min at 3000 rpm. The supernatant was divided into
three aliquots for detection, preservation or validation.
All environmental samples were stored at 4 °C and
transported to local influenza network laboratories at the
11 prefectural centers for disease control and prevention
(CDCs) within 48 h. Then, each sample was divided
equally into three parts and stored at −70 °C. The first part
was tested for influenza A viral nucleic acid in the network
laboratory within one week. Samples positive for influenza
A virus were further typed as H7, H9 and N9. For those
samples positive for influenza A virus, another two parts
were transported to the Zhejiang provincial influenza net-
work laboratory for validation and preservation.
Serological surveillance among poultry-related workers
was performed in the first quarter of each year. The
poultry-related workers were randomly selected from
the sampling sites for collection of environmental speci-
mens in the first quarter of 2013 and 2014, whether they
were healthy or not. At least two workers were surveyed
at every sampling site, and each prefecture was asked to
collect at least 35 samples per year. The surveillance
subjects were those who directly contacted poultry
(physical contact with poultry or related biological mat-
ter, including blood, internal organs, eggs, secretions,
feces, or poultry cages) [11] in LPMs (wholesale and re-
tail), poultry rearing farms, backyard poultry farms,
slaughtering and processing plants, and those who dir-
ectly contacted migratory birds or their excreta in habi-
tats. Eligible workers were identified through inquiring
about their work in detail and from field observation.
Fasting venous blood (5 ml) was collected from eachworker. Serum samples were prepared by precipitation
and centrifugation using standard procedures and then
divided into three aliquots. The first was preserved in
network laboratories of the 11 prefectural CDCs at −20 °
C or below. The other two were transported to Zhejiang
Provincial CDC (one for detecting antibodies against in-
fluenza A (H7N9) virus and the other for transport to
the Chinese National Influenza Center for validation).
Statistical analysis
We compared the age of H7N9 cases and that of
poultry-related workers between the three waves using
Student’s t-test or F test. Pearson’s chi-square or Fisher’s
exact test were used to compare sex and occupational
distribution of the cases between the three waves, and to
compare the positive rates between urban (including cit-
ies and suburbs) and rural areas (referring to the coun-
tryside). A trend chi-square test was used to analyze the
trend of positive rates across the three waves.
Laboratory testing
Respiratory specimens of the cases were tested by rRT-
PCR and viral isolation following standard laboratory
protocols [9]. RNA was extracted from specimens with
the Qiagen RNeasy mini kit, and rRT-PCR was then per-
formed with H7N9-specific primers and probes as per
the manufacturer’s protocol. For viral isolation, we inoc-
ulated respiratory specimens in allantoic cavities of
pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs. Environmental
specimens were also tested by rRT-PCR using the same
protocols described above. For fasting serum specimens
from poultry workers, antibodies against H7N9 virus
were detected by a hemagglutination inhibition assay
using horse red blood cells, following laboratory proce-
dures issued by the World Health Organization [12].
rRT-PCR was performed at local influenza network la-
boratories and validated by the Zhejiang provincial influ-
enza network laboratory. The hemagglutination inhibition
assay was conducted at laboratory of Zhejiang provincial
influenza network laboratory and validated by Chinese
National Influenza Center.
Ethical review
Our study was reviewed and approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial Center for Disease
Control and Prevention. All poultry-related workers pro-
vided written consents of participating in the study
before investigators starting the interviews.
Results
Distribution of H7N9 human infections
From March 2013 to February 2015, a total of 170
H7N9 human cases were identified in Zhejiang Province,
China. In each respective wave, 45, 94 and 31 cases were
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17, 42 and 23 counties; and 5, 9 and 8 prefectures.
Of the 170 cases, 51.8 % (88/170) were from rural
areas. The proportion of rural cases increased from 42.2
to 67.7 % across the three waves (trend χ2 = 4.549, P =
0.038). About 19 % cases were identified after the LPMs
were closed and the proportion increased from 11 % in
the first wave to 32 % in the third wave (trend χ2 = 5.067,
P = 0.027). There was no significant upward or down-
ward trend in death rate among the three waves (trend
χ2 = 3.767, P = 0.052). The mean age of H7N9 cases was
59.7 ± 14.4 years in the first wave, 55.3 ± 17.5 years in
the second wave and 55.7 ± 13.6 years in the third wave
(F = 1.170, P = 0.313). The sex distribution did not differ
significantly between the first wave (62.2 % males), sec-
ond wave (68.1 % males) and third wave (71.0 % males)
(χ2 = 0.736, P = 0.699). Although no significant difference
was seen among the three waves in occupational distri-
bution of H7N9 cases, there were more farmers in the
third wave (64.5 %) than in the first (37.8 %) and second
wave (46.8 %) (Table 1).
Since the first H7N9 case emerged on 13 March 2013
in the first wave, the number of cases increased sharply
and most occurred in the first half of April 2013. The
last case of this wave occurred on 16 April 2013. Of all
1,329 towns in Zhejiang Province, 29.5 % (including all
towns with case reports) closed the LPMs of central
towns between 13 and 22 April 2013. The first case in
the second wave emerged on 6 October 2013. The onset
dates of most cases were concentrated in January of
2014. After 70.7 % of towns closed LPMs in town cen-
ters between 1 January and 15 February in 2014, the
number of cases declined rapidly. Although the Zhejiang
provincial government ordered closing all LPMs of cen-





Rural, n (%) 88(51.8) 19(42.2
Onset after closure of live poultry markets, n (%) 32(18.8) 5(11.1)
Deaths, n (%) 56(32.9) 10(22.2
Age (years) 56.5 ± 16.1 59.7 ±







Child 3(1.8) 0(0.0)emerged in November of 2014, marking the beginning
of the ongoing third wave (Fig. 1).
Risk of H7N9 virus in poultry-related environments
A total of 1,488 poultry-related premises were selected
as surveillance sites from March 2013 to February 2015,
which were distributed in 503 towns of 90 counties in
Zhejiang Province. Of the 1,488 premises, 63.1 % (939),
15.8 % (235), 11.6 % (173), 2.4 % (36), 2.2 % (32) and
4.9 % (73) were LPMs, poultry rearing farms, concen-
trated areas of backyard poultry farms, slaughtering and
processing plants, habitats for migratory birds, and other
premises, respectively.
We collected 14,207 environmental specimens from the
premises, and 6.1 % (868) tested positive for H7N9 virus.
The positive rates in LPMs (8.8 %) and other poultry-
related premises (8.2 %) were higher than in slaughtering
and processing plants (4.9 %), poultry rearing farms
(0.3 %), concentrated areas of backyard poultry farms
(0.1 %), and habitats for migratory birds (0.0 %) (χ2 =
549.351, P < 0.001). Overall, the positive rates of H7N9
virus in the environment presented a gradually increasing
trend in Zhejiang Province during the period March
2013- February 2015. There were two peaks, in January of
2014 and 2015 (Table 2).
Of 503 selected towns, 32.0 % (161) had H7N9 virus
detected in their environment. The proportion of posi-
tive towns was 5.6 % in the first wave, which went up to
19.5 % in the second wave and 37.1 % in the third wave
(trend χ2 = 45.996, P < 0.001). At the same time, 16.0 %
(238/1,488) of premises tested positive for H7N9 virus
and this proportion increased from 2.8 to 28.2 % across
the three waves trend χ2 = 91.319, P < 0.001). The posi-
tive rates of H7N9 virus in environmental specimens in
the three waves of infection increased gradually from 0.7ion— Zhejiang Province, China, March 2013-February 2015
= 45) Second (n = 94) Third (n = 31) Statistic P value
) 48(51.1) 21(67.7) 4.549 0.038
17(18.1) 10(32.3) 5.067 0.027
) 39(41.5) 13(41.9) 3.767 0.052
14.4 55.3 ± 17.5 55.7 ± 13.6 1.170 0.313








Fig. 1 Epidemic curve for H7N9 human infections— Zhejiang Province, China, March 2013-February 2015 at 1-day intervals
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positive rates of H7N9 virus from the various premises
and samples showed significant upward trends during
the progress of the three waves (all P values less than
0.05) (Table 3).
Overall, there were no significant differences between
urban and rural areas in proportions of H7N9 virus-
positive towns (urban: 33.7 %, rural: 31.0 %, P = 0.543),
premises (urban: 15.4 %, rural: 16.3 %, P = 0.711) and en-
vironmental specimens (urban: 5.9 %, rural: 6.0 %, P =
0.730). All three proportions increased gradually from
the first to third wave in both urban and rural areas (P <
0.05). Almost no significant differences in proportion of
positive H7N9 virus were found between urban and rural
areas in the first wave (P > 0.05). However, these propor-
tions were higher in urban than in rural areas in the sec-
ond wave (P < 0.05) and conversely, were significantly
higher in rural areas in the third wave (P < 0.05) (Table 4).
Serological survey of H7N9 antibodies in poultry-related
workers
A total of 912 poultry-related workers were recruited from
337 premises of 75 towns. The mean age was 49.8 ±
11.3 years (range 4–84 years) and 58.2 % of them were
male. There were no differences in age (t = −1.363, P =
0.173) or sex distribution (χ2 = 2.364, P = 0.124) between
the first and second wave.
Of the poultry-related workers, 3.7 % (34) tested posi-
tive for H7N9 antibody according to the criteria de-
scribed in the methods. The positive rate in the second
wave (6.5 %, 33/511) was significantly higher than in the
first wave (0.25 %, 1/401) (P < 0.001). Poultry-related
workers from concentrated areas of backyard poultry
farms (7.7 %, 22/284) and poultry rearing farms (3.7 %,
11/300) had higher positive rates for H7N9 antibodythan those from LPMs (0.4 %, 1/227). No workers with
positive H7N9 antibodies were identified from slaughter-
ing and processing plants (0/28), habitats for migratory
birds (0/26) or other premises (0/47). Only one worker
from an LPM tested positive for H7N9 antibodies in the
first wave; the remaining 33 were identified in the sec-
ond wave (11 from poultry rearing farms and 22 from
concentrated areas of backyard poultry farms). In addition,
none of the workers reported any respiratory symptoms
during the past month.
Discussion
LPMs are considered to be the sources of H7N9 viral
human infections based on the evidence of case ex-
posure history [13–15] and gene sequence similarity
between viral isolates [7, 16]. Closure of LPMs was
conducted to block the transmission of H7N9 virus
and was thought to be the most effective method for
restricting the epidemic at the present stage in China
[17, 18]. The government of Zhejiang Province closed
all LPMs in central towns in July 2014, prior to the
emergence of the third wave of infection. The number
of H7N9 cases in the third wave was significantly
lower than in the previous two waves. However, the
closure of LPMs in central towns forced the forward-
ing of contaminated poultry to rural markets, which
led to a relative increase of H7N9 cases in rural areas
and an increase in number of infected rural towns. In
Zhejiang Province, almost 20 % of cases occurred
after closure of LPMs in their residential area, and
this proportion increased with the progress of the
three waves. This suggested that the closure of LPMs
led to development of alternative market channel op-
tions, including illegal trading [19, 20], or led urban
families to purchase live poultry from rural markets.
Table 2 Monthly results of surveillance for H7N9 virus at different premises of Zhejiang Province, China, March 2013-February 2015












2013–3 0.0 (0/119) 0.0 (0/77) 0.0 (0/24) 0.0 (0/10) 0/0 0/0 0.0 (0/8)
2013–4 1.1 (11/1045) 2.3 (7/303) 1.0 (4/382) 0.0 (0/201) 0.0 (0/17) 0.0 (0/59) 0.0 (0/83)
2013–5 0.0 (0/96) 0/0 0.0 (0/46) 0.0 (0/30) 0/0 0.0 (0/20) 0/0
2013–6 0.0 (0/60) 0.0 (0/19) 0.0 (0/35) 0.0 (0/6) 0/0 0/0 0/0
2013–7 0.0 (0/57) 0.0 (0/20) 0.0 (0/31) 0/0 0/0 0/0 0.0 (0/6)
2013–8 0.0 (0/62) 0.0 (0/43) 0.0 (0/12) 0/0 0/0 0.0 (0/7) 0/0
2013–9 0.0 (0/60) 0.0 (0/49) 0.0 (0/11) 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
Total of the 1st wave 0.7 (11/1499) 1.4 (7/511) 0.7 (4/541) 0.0 (0/247) 0.0 (0/17) 0.0 (0/86) 0.0 (0/97)
2013–10 2 (6/301) 3.1 (6/195) 0.0 (0/75) 0.0 (0/25) 0/0 0/0 0.0 (0/6)
2013–11 1.1 (4/372) 1.5 (4/266) 0.0 (0/62) 0.0 (0/19) 0/0 0.0 (0/5) 0.0 (0/20)
2013–12 3.5 (11/318) 4.2 (11/262) 0.0 (0/30) 0/0 0.0 (0/8) 0.0 (0/5) 0.0 (0/13)
2014–1 10.2 (259/2551) 11.3 (259/2299) 0.0 (0/105) 0.0 (0/133) 0.0 (0/2) 0.0 (0/9) 0.0 (0/3)
2014–2 2.7 (29/1073) 4.0 (29/732) 0.0 (0/141) 0.0 (0/146) 0.0 (0/6) 0/0 0.0 (0/48)
2014–3 1.6 (9/554) 3.7 (9/242) 0.0 (0/146) 0.0 (0/114) 0.0 (0/18) 0.0 (0/5) 0.0 (0/29)
2014–4 1.1 (6/545) 3.1 (6/194) 0.0 (0/168) 0.0 (0/164) 0.0 (0/5) 0.0 (0/14) 0/0
2014–5 0.3 (2/714) 0.7 (2/303) 0.0 (0/83) 0.0 (0/279) 0.0 (0/5) 0.0 (0/14) 0.0 (0/30)
2014–6 3.4 (10/290) 6.8 (8/118) 2.6 (2/78) 0.0 (0/53) 0.0 (0/25) 0.0 (0/16) 0/0
2014–7 1.7 (6/358) 2.7 (6/219) 0.0 (0/72) 0.0 (0/22) 0.0 (0/10) 0.0 (0/9) 0.0 (0/26)
2014–8 0.0 (0/519) 0.0 (0/298) 0.0 (0/104) 0.0 (0/58) 0.0 (0/32) 0.0 (0/24) 0.0 (0/3)
2014–9 2.1 (9/419) 3.8 (9/234) 0.0 (0/80) 0.0 (0/43) 0.0 (0/18) 0.0 (0/22) 0.0 (0/22)
2014–10 3.9 (25/633) 5.9 (25/424) 0.0 (0/119) 0.0 (0/18) 0.0 (0/12) 0.0 (0/11) 0.0 (0/49)
Total of the 2nd wave 4.3 (376/8647) 6.5 (374/5786) 0.2 (2/1263) 0.0 (0/1074) 0.0 (0/141) 0.0 (0/134) 0.0 (0/249)
2014–11 3(17/572) 5.0 (17/343) 0.0 (0/69) 0.0 (0/18) 0.0 (0/62) 0.0 (0/45) 0.0 (0/35)
2014–12 2.6(21/808) 3.8 (19/499) 0.0 (0/142) 0.0 (0/70) 8.0 (2/25) 0.0 (0/44) 0.0 (0/28)
2015–1 20.2(242/1197) 24.3 (198/815) 0.0 (0/151) 0.0 (0/32) 17.8 (13/73) 0.0 (0/6) 25.8 (31/120)
2015–2 13.5(201/1484) 16.8 (170/1012) 0.0 (0/127) 1.5 (2/130) 7.7 (2/26) 0.0 (0/8) 14.9 (27/181)
Total of the 3rd wave 11.8 (481/4061) 15.1 (404/2669) 0.0 (0/489) 0.8 (2/250) 9.1 (17/186) 0.0 (0/103) 15.9 (58/364)
Total 6.1(868/14207) 8.8 (785/8966) 0.3 (6/2293) 0.1 (2/1571) 4.9 (17/344) 0.0 (0/323) 8.2 (58/710)
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virus through exposure to rural markets.
Our study showed that the proportions of positive
towns and premises increased nearly 6 times from the
first wave to the third. The expanding geographical
range of contamination by H7N9 virus suggests that hu-
man infections will continuously emerge and may de-
velop into new waves of epidemics. Compared to other
avian influenza viruses, H7N9 virus is more adaptive to
infection of mammals [1] and is readily transmitted
through direct contact [21]. Data from the China Infor-
mation System for Disease Control and Prevention iden-
tified 17 clustering events in China as of February 2015,
and 11 of them might have been transmitted from per-
son to person. Therefore, this implies that once H7N9
virus develops the ability for sustained transmissionbetween humans, it may lead to a new round of pan-
demic influenza.
Our results also showed that the positive rates of H7N9
virus in sewage used for cleaning poultry and from swabs
of tables used for slaughtering or processing poultry were
significantly higher than in other environmental samples.
This might be due to droplets generated during poultry
slaughtering that contain viral particles [3]. The increasing
positive rate of H7N9 virus from the first to the third wave
suggested an enhancement of viability in the environment
and transmissibility among poultry, which might be due
to the change in its genetic architecture caused by co-
circulation and reassortment between H7N9, H9N2 and
other influenza viruses [22, 23].
Additional analysis found that the positive rate of H7N9
virus was significantly higher on premises that were
Table 3 Comparison on positive rates of environmental surveillance for H7N9 virus, by three waves — Zhejiang Province, China,
March 2013-February 2015
Characteristics 1st wave 2nd wave 3rd wave Total Trend χ2 value P value
Towns, % (positive towns/total towns) 5.6 (5/90) 19.5 (69/354) 37.1 (104/280) 32.0 (161/503) 45.996 <0.001
Premises, % (positive premises/total premises) 2.8 (5/181) 11.0 (98/890) 28.2 (138/490) 16.0 (238/1488) 91.319 <0.001
Environmental samples of different premises, %
(positive specimens/total specimens)
0.7 (11/1499) 4.3 (376/8647) 11.8 (481/4061) 6.1 (868/14207) 335.989 <0.001
Live poultry markets 1.4 (7/511) 6.5 (374/5786) 15.1 (404/2669) 8.8 (785/8966) 203.645 <0.001
Poultry rearing farms 0.7 (4/541) 0.2 (2/1263) 0.0 (0/489) 0.3 (6/2293) 5.558 0.029
Concentrated areas of backyard poultry farms 0.0 (0/247) 0.0 (0/1074) 0.8 (2/250) 0.1 (2/1571) 6.302 0.049
Slaughtering and processing plants 0.0 (0/17) 0.0 (0/141) 9.1 (17/186) 4.9 (17/344) 13.232 <0.001
Habitats for migratory birds 0.0 (0/86) 0.0 (0/134) 0.0 (0/103) 0.0 (0/323) - -
Others 0.0 (0/97) 0.0 (0/249) 15.9 (58/364) 8.2 (58/710) 48.346 <0.001
Environment samples of different types, % (positive
specimens/total specimens)
0.7 (11/1499) 4.3 (376/8647) 11.8 (481/4061) 6.1 (868/14207) 335.989 <0.001
Fecal dropping swab 0.3 (2/702) 2.8 (94/3306) 9.7 (174/1786) 4.7 (270/5794) 145.342 <0.001
Poultry cage swabs 0.0 (0/315) 5.4 (106/1956) 11.3 (85/750) 6.3 (191/3021) 55.669 <0.001
Drinking water samples 1.0 (2/201) 2.9 (27/943) 10.1 (34/338) 4.3 (63/1482) 31.962 <0.001
Sewage from cleaning poultry 1.5 (1/67) 5.0 (43/859) 20.2 (61/302) 8.6 (105/1228) 62.802 <0.001
Swabs of tables for slaughtering or processing poultry 1.6 (1/61) 7.3 (78/1063) 14.6 (93/636) 9.8 (172/1760) 28.542 <0.001
Others 3.3 (5/153) 5.4 (28/520) 13.7 (34/249) 7.3 (67/922) 18.342 <0.001
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positive only for H7. Thus, regular phylogenetic analysis is
needed to uncover the genetic variation and recombin-
ation of H7N9 virus. In the meantime, disinfection and
other measures also should be taken to eliminate the rich
environment for reassortment of these viruses.
As previous studies reported [3, 24], the positive rate
of H7N9 virus in LPMs was much higher than in
poultry rearing farms. In addition, we didn’t detect any
positive samples in migratory bird habitats. These ob-
servations supported the following inferences on the
sources and transmission of H7N9 virus: the virus is
reassorted on poultry farms [6], and then reproduces,
is transmitted and evolves mainly in LPMs owing to
the markets’ ideal environment in China [25]. This
suggests that more severe measures including disinfec-
tion, market rest periods and persistent surveillance
should be conducted before all LPMs are permanently
closed both in urban and rural area.
Of note, with the closure of LPMs in central towns,
more and more poultry slaughtering and processing
plants have been constructed as a new alternative to
meet the new consumption pattern. There was a high
positive rate of environmental specimens collected from
these plants in the third wave, whereas no positive sam-
ples were identified in the past two waves. Therefore,
similar measures, such as surveillance, disinfection and
supervision, should also be strictly carried out in allslaughtering and processing plants to avoid H7N9 virus
contaminating trade markets. We noticed that the posi-
tive rate at other environmental premises was also high,
and the data showed that these samples were mostly col-
lected from places where H7N9 cases lived. However,
detailed investigation should be conducted to clarify the
process of contamination.
In urban areas, attributable to closure of LPMs in cen-
tral towns, the proportion of positive towns, premises
and environmental samples were not significantly differ-
ent for the second and third waves. As a matter of fact,
the contamination area of H7N9 virus is expanding in
urban areas because we did not count positive sites or
specimens distributed in central towns in the third wave
(after the LPMs were closed). Moreover, the proportion
of positive towns, premises and environmental samples
in rural areas increased rapidly from the first wave to
the third, suggesting that strict control measures should
be taken in rural areas as well.
Serological surveys of poultry-related workers showed a
positive rate above 6 %, which was similar to what was re-
ported in a previous study in Zhejiang Province [26] and
significantly higher than in another southern province of
China [3], where an H7N9 viral epidemic emerged later
than in Zhejiang. More importantly, we found that the
positive rate was much higher among workers from farms
than from LPMs. Detailed investigation showed that these
positive workers were concentrated in several villages,
Table 4 Comparison of positive rates of environmental surveillance for H7N9 virus by residential area (urban and rural) — Zhejiang rovince, China, March 2013-February 2015
Characteristics 1st wave 2nd wave 3rd wave Total P value of trend
Urban Rural P value Urban Rural P value Urban Rural P value Urban Rural P value Urban Rural
Towns, % (positive
towns/total towns)









0.6 (3/472) 0.9 (8/879) 0.756 5.8 (188/3221) 2.1 (94/4444) <0.001 8.0 (97/1207) 14.2 (382/2697) <0.001 5.9 (2 /4900) 6.0 (484/8020) 0.730 <0.001 <0.001
Live poultry markets 1.2 (3/252) 1.7 (4/229) 0.714 7.1 (188/2637) 3.8 (92/2427) <0.001 8.7 (59/675) 18.1 (343/1894) <0.001 7.0 (2 /3564) 9.6 (439/4550) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001




0.0 (0/15) 0.0 (0/200) - 0.0 (0/157) 0.0 (0/891) - 0.0 (0/60) 1.1 (2/186) 1.000 0.0 (0 32) 0.2 (2/1277) 1.000 - 0.017
Slaughtering and
processing plants
0.0 (0/11) 0.0 (0/6) - 0.0 (0/77) 0.0 (0/44) - 9.2 (12/131) 9.1 (5/55) 1.000 5.5 (1 219) 4.8 (5/105) 1.000 0.010 0.057
Habitats for migratory
birds
0.0 (0/19) 0.0 (0/67) - 0.0 (0/14) 0.0 (0/84) - 0.0 (0/6) 0.0 (0/81) - 0.0 (0 9) 0.0 (0/232) - - -
Others 0.0 (0/47) 0.0 (0/40) - 0.0 (0/152) 0.0 (0/54) - 15.3 (26/170) 16.5 (32/194) 0.776 7.0 (2 369) 11.1 (32/288) 0.073 <0.001 <0.001
Environment samples
of different types, %
(positive specimens/
total specimens)
0.6 (3/472) 0.9 (8/879) 0.756 5.8 (188/3221) 2.1 (94/4444) <0.001 8.0 (97/1207) 14.2 (382/2697) <0.001 5.9 (2 /4900) 6.0 (484/8020) 0.730 <0.001 <0.001
Fecal dropping swab 0.0 (0/190) 0.5 (2/432) 1.000 2.7 (26/977) 1.7 (33/1897) 0.126 4.1 (17/410) 12.3 (156/1273) <0.001 2.7 (4 1577) 5.3 (191/3602) <0.001 0.004 <0.001
Poultry cage swab 0.0 (0/114) 0.0 (0/167) - 7.6 (60/786) 2.0 (19/970) <0.001 8.7 (17/196) 12.4 (67/540) 0.190 7.0 (7 1096) 5.1 (86/1677) 0.039 0.013 <0.001
Drinking water sample 0.0 (0/47) 1.5 (2/131) 1.000 5.5 (16/289) 1.2 (7/578) <0.001 5.9 (6/102) 12.8 (28/219) 0.079 5.0 (2 438) 4.0 (37/928) 0.394 0.251 <0.001
Sewage of cleaning
poultry
0.0 (0/30) 2.7 (1/37) 1.000 6.3 (25/400) 3.5 (14/395) 0.100 14.0 (18/129) 26.2 (43/164) 0.013 7.7 (4 559) 9.7 (58/596) 0.252 0.001 <0.001
Swab of tables for
slaughtering
or processing poultry
2.9 (1/34) 0.0 (0/23) 1.000 7.7 (39/509) 4.0 (15/375) 0.032 9.0 (20/223) 18.1 (73/403) 0.002 7.8 (6 766) 11.0 (88/801) 0.038 0.305 <0.001
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human infections.
Our study has some limitations. First, because the
premises used for collection of environmental specimens
were selected from an area with a higher risk of presence
of H7N9 virus, the positive rates of H7N9 virus in the
environment might be overestimated. However, the ef-
fect on the trend across the three waves was slight since
the principles for selecting premises and sampling sites
was unchanged. Secondly, serological surveillance was
performed in the influenza epidemic period (the first
quarter of each year), so the positive rate of poultry-
related workers might be overestimated as well. Finally,
the survey was conducted once a quarter in each prefec-
ture in 2013. Although a third of counties were ran-
domly selected each time, they can’t all be completely
covered in the same season, which would decrease the
accuracy of positive rates.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our study highlights that poultry-related
environmental contamination by H7N9 virus is intensi-
fying. In light of our findings, we strongly recommend
that the local government attach great importance to
this serious issue and take effective measures immedi-
ately. Knowledge of safe methods of consumption of live
poultry and related products must be forwarded to civil-
ians to help them improve their habits of fresh poultry
ingestion. Management of the live poultry trade should
be more rigorous and illegal trading must be stopped
immediately. If possible, local governments should close
all LPMs (including wholesale and retail markets) in the
whole territory, speed the construction of standard
plants for slaughtering and processing live poultry, and
establish a supply system for cold fresh poultry. More-
over, poultry operations in slaughtering and processing
plants must be managed and supervised rigorously to
avoid entry of contaminated cold fresh poultry to trading
markets, supermarkets, restaurants and other related
premises. Prior to the closure of LPMs, disinfection, rest
days and other measures should be carried out strictly
both in urban and in rural areas. These measures should
include thorough daily cleaning and disinfecting of all
areas and facilities potentially contaminated by H7N9
virus, centralized collection and proper disposal of trash
and dead poultry, designating certain days as market rest
days, and banning of overnight poultry storage.
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